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Numbers, limits, and continuity in Gauss 
 In the eighteenth century, infinitely large  and infinitesimal quantities 
were thought to be entities   that could   be manipulated   in the same 
way as numbers   except   for the principle   of cancellation   
At the beginning of 19
th
 century, Gauss rejected   this approach  . 
According   to him, a lot of circumspection   was required   in treating   
infinite  quantities these were to be  allowed in analytical   reasoning   
insofar    as they can be reduced   to the theory   of limits (Gauss, In 
Disquisitiones generales circa seriem infinitam , 159]). 
More explicitly, in a letter to Schumacher, 12 July 1831, Gauss 
stated:  
"I protest   in the first   place   against   the use of infinite magnitude   
as something completed  , which is never allowed   in mathematics. 
The infinite is but a façon de parler in that one actually   speaks of 
limits to which certain   relations   come as close as one desires , 
while others   are allowed   to increase   without   bound  ." (Gauss [WW, 
8:216]) 
It is clear that Gauss wants to reduce infinite quantities to the 
theory of limits. But: 
What is Gauss‟s notion of limit?             
It is not difficult to realize that there are crucial differences between 
his notion and the modern one.    
For examples, let‟s consider De origine proprietatibus que generales 
numerorum mediorum arithmetico- Geometricorum, a paper where 
Gauss gave this definition of the arithmetic-geometric mean (agm) 
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 Given two (positive) numbers a and b, he first considered the 
sequences alpha and beta 
a=a0, 1
2
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n
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
 ;  and  b=b0, 1n n nb a b   for n=1,2,… 
 
 
  Then he observed that  
1) an >bn, for n=1,2,.., 
2) an were increasing and bn were decreasing, 
3) the inequality an+1- bn+1=(an-bn)/2 held.  
Then, using equality      21 1
1
0
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Property 1 is trivial;   properties 2 and 3 involve that both the 
sequences have limits: manifestum est utramque habere limitem. 
Indeed, the first sequence decreases but remains greater the  
                                            
second, vice versa  the second sequence increases but is less than 
the first. 
Gauss denotes the limits by these symbols  
(S) a
∞
 and b
∞ 
 
 3 
 Another property is this. 
  
Property 4 implies that the sequence of differences n na b  is  
 
  
decreasing and has 0 as a limit.  
 
                                  
Of consequence, the two sequences an and bn have the same limit 
a
∞
 = b
∞
, 
   
This limit is the arithmetico-geometric mean of a and b 
Gauss denoted it by the symbol M(a,b) (see [WM, 361-362]).  
   
Two remarks are appropriate 
                                                                        
First, Gauss did not use the term “limit” in a technical sense,                 
but in a common sense. For him, limes means the bound  
(In Latin, limes means “strip of uncultivated ground marking boundary”). 
                                                                          
In Gauss, the concept of limit is not defined but is intuitively given 
                                                           
it is clear that for Gauss limits have property (P): 
 
(P)  if c is the limit of cn then the difference    
  
   |cn-c|           is less than         
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for every  and for large enough n. 
 
 
                                                          
In modern mathematics, (P) is the definition of limit and the notion 
                  
of limit is entirely reduced to this definition, which, in principle, 
               
can be changed and so the notion of limit can be changed. 
 
 
                                                                             
Instead, for Gauss, (P) is not a definition but a property of  
        
the intuitive concept of limits which cannot be changed.  
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The second remark is that Gauss‟s definition of the arithmetic-
geometric means tacitly   used   this lemma    
 
Lemma.  
                  
Given an increasing  sequence k  
                                           
if this sequence has an upper bound, then there is a number L  
that is the limit of  sequence k  as k goes to infinity  (k) 
                                       
Gauss employed the same lemma at least in another paper, 
Disquisitiones generales circa seriem infinitam, where he used it to 
                     
prove the convergence test today named after him 
 
Gauss‟s test stated that if a given sequence Mk, satisfies these 
conditions: 
the ratios (1) Mk+1/Mk are of the type  
(2)                       1k
k
M P ( m k )
M Q ( m k )
 




, k=0,1,2,…, 
where m is an positive integer, and P and Q are polynomials of the kind  
(3) P(t)=t
+A1t
-1+A2t
-2+…+A  
(4) Q(t)=t
+a1t
-1+a2t
-2+…+a,  
(5) A1-a1<-1. 
 
then the series   
(6) 
0
k
k
M


  converges   
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In one of the steps of his long proof, Gauss showed that 
    
under certain condition (if A2-a2 is greater than 0) 
                                                                                
- the sequence |Mk| taken in absolute value increases and  
                    
- there is a decreasing sequence Nk such that 
 
em kei is less than en kei in absolute value 
|Mk|<|Nk|. 
 
  
Hence   - Gauss concluded  -  
  
|Mk|                                 is convergent to a finite limit. 
      
De origine proprietatibusque generales numerorum mediorum arithm. Geometricorum,   
Disquisitiones generales circa seriem infinitam,   
 
In these two papers Gauss did not provide   a proof of the lemma,  
 
 
  
A question is natural      
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Is the existence of the supremum of these sequences a hidden   
assumption    in Gauss‟s reasoning   
 
 
 
To answer, it is useful to consider  
        
a discussion of the      supremum                       
  
which is found in one of Gauss‟s manuscript  
Grundbegriffe der lehre von den Reihen 
 
 
 
  
Here, Gauss considered a series an such that all its terms are less 
than a given number l  
He defined this number l to be the upper bound of the sequence (in 
Gauss‟s terms: limes supra seriem) 
 
Then Gauss stated that the upper bound has these properties: 
 
1) any number M greater than lis also an upper bound 
In the second property Gauss introduces the supremum   
  
2) given a number  less than a fixed upper bound l IF 
 8 
 
(a)   is not an upper bound and 
                     
(b)  is allowed to assume the value l by moving through  
  
       all the intermediate quantities in a continuous way,  
                  
THEN k necessarily reaches the least upper bound L (the 
supremum of the series). 
 
 
            
3) no term of the series can be greater L,  
                                                                                       
4) but, for large enough n, there are terms that exceed any 
number z<L 
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Gauss characterized the supremum correctly;  
                                                                             but his reasoning, 
from a modern point of view, fails  
                                                      
Indeed Gauss again stated the existence of supremum but did not 
                                 
prove it and this is due to the lacking of an adequate construction of 
real numbers 
 
                                 
Let‟s note that the requirement of this proof  is precisely  
the starting point of Dedekind‟s theory of real numbers in his Stetigkeit 
und irrationale Zahlen.  
Unlike Dedekind, Gauss did not feel the need to construct the set of  
  
real numbers 
 
                 
Guass‟s approach can be understood if we assume that  
  
his concept of the continuum was essentially different 
  
 from the modern one 
 
                                    
Indeed, Gauss was linked to a revised notion of the traditional 
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continuous quantity, which he had inherited from eighteenth-century 
mathematics 
 
                                 
To clarify my thesis I observe that from about 1740s 
  
mathematicians grounded analysis upon the notion of general 
quantity 
 
  
General quantity was merely the result of a process of abstraction  
  
practised upon geometric quantities (which, in turns, abstracted [æb'stræktid] from 
physical ['fizikel] quantities).  
 
                                               
Thus, even if analysis was conceived to be independent of  
                                                         
geometry, general quantities were substantially intuited as 
 segments of a straight line and, therefore, was intrinsically 
continuous,  
 
in Kantian   terms, they derived  from an empirical  intuition    
(Of course [k:s], that made problematic the asserted [e'se:tid] independence [,indi'pendens] of 
analysis from geometry. I have tried [traid] to explain the sense of this claim [kleim] of eighteenth-
century mathematicians in my [2001].) 
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Through the 18
th
 century, analysis, which in principle was also  
  
independent of arithmetic -the realm of the discrete quantity-, was 
 de facto more and more connected with numbers  
  
(rational, irrational, complex numbers)  
 
             
The status of irrational numbers was ambiguous (they was not true  
  
numbers, in the strict sense of word); however any irrational  
                           
number can be approximate by rational numbers and this (with the 
  
aid of the geometrical intuition) was considered sufficient. 
  
Thus, from the end of 18
th
   and the beginnings of 19
th
   century,  
                                     
continuous quantity moved away from its original geometrical model  
                
and reduced to the mere intuition of a sequence of numbers,  
  
which flows  from a value to another assuming all intermediate 
values -without jumps  - 
 
                 
 12 
 this is precisely the idea of Gauss in his reasoning about the 
supremum (This idea was largely ['l:d¥li] shared [ee+d] in the first  [fe:st] decades ['dekeid+s] of 19th century) 
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Therefore, Gauss no longer dealt with the 18
th
 century notion of  
                                    
quantity, which was drawn from geometric sources, rather he  
                  
grounded on the intuitively given numerical continuum 
 
 
 
(I use the term „intuition‟ in the sense that Gauss gave to it in [WD, 57]: “we can have an 
idea of quantity in two ways, either by immediate intuition (an immediate [i'mi:djet] idea), or 
by comparison [kem'pærisen] with other quantities given by immediate [i'mi:djet] intuition 
(mediate ['mi:di,eit] idea).”)  
 
 
                                        
In other terms, Gauss viewed the numerical continuum  
 
                   
as a basic and intuitive object of analysis and considered it 
 
  
 in connection with any sort of an a priori intuition (namely, with a 
 
                                              
 knowledge that does not appeal to any particular experience 
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Gauss‟s conception was based upon modified Kantian notions.  
 
  
Kant believed that space and time were a priori intuitions from 
                       
which the certainty of geometry and arithmetic derived. 
                                                                               
It is well known that Gauss did not accept the whole theory of 
mathematical knowledge of Kant and, in particular, the idea that 
space is a priori  intuition  
In a letter to Bessel he wrote [rout]: “we cannot establish [i'stæbli] geometry entirely [en'taieli] a priori”  [January 27, 
1829, WW, 8:200]).  
 
                              
However, he shared some crucial points of Kantian philosophy: 
            
- the importance of intuition, 
                               
- the existence of an a priori intuition, that guarantees the certainty 
of mathematical knowledge; 
                                                                     
- the fact that mathematical intuition concerns abstract objects       
          (universal   objects)  
                                  
         but it can show only by empirical objects  
                 (universal in concreto) 
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For example, in his review of Commentatio in primum elementorum  
                                          
Euclidis librum, a book published in 1814  ,  
                                  
Gauss noted that a great part of the book turned on the contention 
  
against Kant that the certainty of geometry was not based on  
intuition but on definitions and on the principium identitatis and the 
principium contradictionis,  
 
                                               
According to Gauss, Kant certainly did not wish to deny that use 
 
was constantly made in geometry of these logical aids to the  
  
presentation and linking of truths.  
                            
However, anybody who was acquainted with the essence of  
                       
geometry knew that they were able to accomplish nothing  
                                                      
by themselves, and they put forth only sterile blossoms unless the 
  
fertilizing living intuition of the object itself prevailed   
 16 
 
everywhere   
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Intuition as immediate representation of an object seems to be what  
                                        
actually allows one to produce and understate mathematics.  
                                                                             
According to Gauss, this intuition was, at least partially a priori                                 
in particular, he thought that number was merely the product of our 
mind. 
                                               
But, unlike Kant, he was convinced that the theory of space had a  
  
completely different position in our knowledge than did „the pure 
theory of quantity‟   
                                                                
Following Kant, which had provided a theoretical basis for the  
     
numerical continuum by means of the notion of time as a pure 
                                                                              
intuition, Gauss thought that intuition of the numerical continuum 
 
           
was originated from a more basic intuition: the a priori intuition of 
time.  
 18 
In Zur Metaphysik der Mathematik, Gauss stated that quantities are 
time, number
1
 and geometrical quantities. He thought that quantity  
                                                                               
can be represented by numbers by measuring it with regard to a  
                                                            
fixed quantity, which is considered as the unit 
                                     
Gauss did not clarify what the measure of an incommensurable  
                               
quantity and an irrational number were. He however seems to 
                                                                   
 consider an irrational number as a determination of continuum  
                    
that can approximate by rationals and individuated by an endless 
number of steps 
                          
Thus, time is crucial to avoid geometrical quantity and to give the 
        impression of analysis as a mere creation of our  mind 
      
Nevertheless, in the mathematical practice, time can be easily  
  
replaced by its numerical representation and Gauss directly  
  
                                                     
1
 Here number means whole number or, at most, rational numbers. 
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operated upon a continuum viewed as an unbroken flow of 
numbers. 
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By describing the continuum as an unbroken flow of numbers,  
                                                          
I don‟t give a definition but only a circumlocution to suggest Gauss‟s 
idea of the continuum: indeed, Gauss‟s continuum can not be really 
defined but only intuited 
 
            
 It is worthwhile noting that this notion allows to separate  
                                                                 
continuous quantity from a geometric substratum: 
                            
continuity that earlier was referred to an empirical intuition (by 
means of geometry), is now reduced to the realm of numbers,  
                                                      
even though by the means of the a priori intuition of time 
 
                                           
This does not mean that numerical continuum was reduced to the  
  
discrete. There was no construction of the continuum: it was  
  
immediately given (with its order structure and the property of 
completeness  ). 
                                                                                          
The relation between numbers and the continuum was inverted with  
                                                     
respect today: numbers did not generate the continuum; rather the  
 21 
numerical continuum was given and one could cut it and determine  
  
any single, specific number. 
 22 
Apart from Kant‟s epistemological influence, Gauss‟s continuum is a  
  
slightly revised version of the traditional notion of the continuum, 
which was at the basis of 18
th
-century calculus (see Breger) 
 
                 The traditional continuum did not consist of points, but 
was given as  
  
a whole. It was an intensional idea characterized by the relation 
between the whole and its possible parts, unlike in Dedekind-Cantor 
continuum, which is based on extensional   set theory (Breger [1992a, 251]) 
 
                            
This conception have remarkable consequences in the calculus: it  
                                          
is sufficient to think that an interval was always thought of as 
including its endpoints (in modern terms, it was always a closed    
interval  ).  
 
                                        
In my opinion, the main difference between Gauss and the 18
th
-
century mathematicians is that the latter thought of a geometric  
                              
continuum and referred directly to geometric quantities, while the 
former referred to a numerical continuum, which, in principle, 
               
 23 
embodies the flowing of time 
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To end, I observe that Gauss’s conception has important 
consequences on continuity of functions  a point can only break 
continuity   of a function, but continuity is not a property   of a point: 
it has no sense to define continuity of a function at a point;  
 
any reasoning implying continuity of a function did not concern   a 
single point, but a part of the continuum   
 
For instance, Gauss stated: “Continuity of the function z) breaks, every time that the 
value is infinitely   large, i.e. for negative   integer    value of z  ” [1812, 147]. 
 
The flow that the variable y   describes   can break  for certain [„se:ten]  exceptional   values 
of z, thus y=(z) is discontinuous   when  
z=-1,-2,-3,…. 
 
What is important for Gauss is that the independent variable z could move   from a point A 
of the domain of definition   to another B (including   the endpoints) in a continuous way 
(fluxo continuo) and that the correspondent   variation   of the dependent variable y is 
continuous as well. 
One could argue   that this idea is unclear, in particular the 
relationship between the single number and the flow of numbers. 
This is true, and I think that some problematic derivations   of 
Disquisitiones generales are probably   linked   to this concept   of 
continuity   
 
For instance,  
Gauss stated that it is evident that F(+k,1) goes to 1 as k 
[1812, 147] 
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Limes functiones F(+k,1), crescente k in infinitum, manifesto 
[est] unitas 
 
F is the hypergeometric [,haipe+g] function    
(2)   F(,x)= 32 x
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In effect, Gauss is calculating   this limit:   
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  ,  
               
Gauss interchanged the operation of limit: however any justification  
                                     
is lacking as if this interchange was immediate and obvious 
 
 
and (x)n is the symbol (3) 
(3) (x)n=x(x+1)(x+2)…(x+n-1)=(x+n)/(x) [Pochhammer symbol]  
[ è (x)0=1] 
 
 A similar   example is at p.151 of his Disquisitiones generales, 
Gauss interchanged  the operation  of limits and that of integration. 
 
Indeed, he derived that equality   
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      Gauss performed operations that are legitimate in the specific 
cases but their legitimacy is not discussed as the legitimacy of these 
operations was obvious 
 Today they are justified by means of appropriate   theorems, 
instead Gauss seems to consider them as evident.  
 It is likely that Gauss approached the matter in a similar manner as 
Cauchy did in his Analyse algébrique some years later, however 
evidences are lacking for more precise hypotheses He possessed 
sophisticated knowledge of complex analysis –see, e.g., [WW, 10:368]- though he did not 
expound them in a systematic way: it is therefore difficult to say of which theorems he was 
aware 
 In any event Gauss‟s concept of the continuum made impossible to 
distinguish between continuity and uniform continuity, convergence  
and uniform convergence, which are necessary for the correct 
formulation of the theorems on the interchange of limits, to which I 
referred early  I end my talk with some observations on continuity of 
functions  . 
In Disquisitiones generales, Gauss stated:  
“Continuity of the function   z) breaks, every time that the value is 
infinitely   large, i.e. for negative   integer    value of z  ” [1812, 147]. 
The flow that the variable y   describes   can break  for certain 
exceptional   values of z, thus y=(z) is discontinuous   when  
z=-1,-2,-3,…. 
However a point can only break continuity   but continuity is not a 
property   of a point: any reasoning implying continuity did not 
concern   a single point, but a part of the continuum  .  
 27 
 
What is important for Gauss is that the independent variable z could 
move   from a point A of the domain of definition   to another B 
(including   the endpoints) in a continuous way (fluxo continuo) and 
that the correspondent   variation   of the dependent variable y is 
continuous as well. 
One could argue   that this idea is unclear, in particular the 
relationship between the single number and the flow of numbers. 
This is true, and I think that some problematic derivations   of 
Disquisitiones generales are probably   linked   to this concept   of 
continuity   
 
For instance,  
Gauss stated that it is evident that F(+k,1) goes to 1 as k 
[1812, 147] 
Limes functiones F(+k,1), crescente k in infinitum, manifesto 
[est] unitas 
 
F is the hypergeometric [,haipe+g] function    
(2)   F(,x)= 32 x
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In effect, Gauss is calculating   this limit:   
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Gauss interchanged  the operation of limit: however any justification   
is lacking as if this interchange  was immediate   and obvious   
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and (x)n is the symbol (3) 
(3) (x)n=x(x+1)(x+2)…(x+n-1)=(x+n)/(x) [Pochhammer symbol]  
[ è (x)0=1] 
A similar example is at p.151 of his Disquisitiones generales, Gauss 
interchanged the operation of limits and that of integration. 
Indeed, he derived that equality 
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   In these two examples, Gauss performed   some operations that 
are legitimate   in the specific   cases   but their legitimacy   is not 
discussed   
Today they are justified by means of appropriate   theorems, instead 
Gauss seems to consider them as evident.  
It is well known that Gauss rejected the infinite extension of finite  rules, which were 
accepted by eighteenth-century mathematicians. Of consequence, it is likely that 
Gauss approached the matter   in a similar manner   as Cauchy did 
in his Analyse algébrique some years later, however evidences   are 
lacking   for more precise   hypotheses   
He possessed sophisticated knowledge of complex analysis –see, e.g., [WW, 10:368]- 
though he did not expound them in a systematic way: it is therefore difficult to say of which 
theorems he was aware 
In any event Gauss‟s concept of the continuum   made impossible 
to distinguish between continuity and uniform continuity, 
 29 
convergence   and uniform convergence, which are necessary for 
the correct formulation   of the theorems on the interchange   of 
limits, to which I referred early. 
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